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A small team at CNAS is getting out of the Beltway “bubble” 
to talk to Americans about what role the United States should 
play on the international scene. 
1  This project is made possible through the government of the Federal Republic of Germany through funds of the European Recovery Program 
(ERP) of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. Additional funds provided by the Robert Bosch Stiftung.
On any given day in Washington, dozens of think tanks that work on national security issues are busy drafting policy memos, meeting with embassy staff 
and foreign visitors, testifying before Congress, 
conducting press interviews, raising funds for 
their research, and hosting events, all in an effort 
to shape U.S. foreign policy. But in the weeks and 
months following the 2016 election, the normal 
rhythm of think tank work slowed considerably. 
The election of Donald Trump as America’s 45th 
president raised some fundamental, and at times, 
paralyzing questions for Washington’s think 
tank community. How did so many wonks both 
on the left and the right miss America’s growing 
disaffection with globalization, a phenomenon that 
helped bring Trump to power? It is incumbent upon 
everyone who works in national security to ask 
ourselves what that fact says about the disconnect 
between Washington and the rest of the country. 
With an administration that prides itself on 
disregarding conventional expertise, we must also 
pose the question: What role should think tanks 
play moving forward? 
Many of us in Washington are still mulling over 
those questions. But at the think tank where I work, 
the bipartisan Center for a New American Security 
(CNAS), my small team working on transatlantic 
security issues quickly came to the conclusion that 
it was time to try something different. Instead of 
spending most of our time interacting with other 
national security experts in Washington (both in 
and out of government) and meeting with allies 
and partners abroad, we needed to engage new 
audiences across the United States. We needed to 
escape the proverbial Beltway bubble. And because 
my program’s mandate is to focus on transatlantic 
relations, my team knew that whatever initiative 
we were going to develop would need to include 
European national security experts as well.
In the spring of 2017, CNAS formally launched 
“Across the Pond, in the Field.”1 Over the course 
of three years, the project will take teams made 
up of two Americans and two Europeans to 12 
cities across the United States. The two American 
envoys come from CNAS, while the Europeans 
we’ve selected have been former ministers, current 
ambassadors, and think tank scholars. The project 
has multiple objectives. We want to expose 
Washingtonians and Europeans to a diverse range 
of American perspectives on transatlantic relations 
and U.S. foreign policy, something they don’t 
necessarily get in national capitals. We also want 
to create opportunities for the Europeans on these 
trips to develop lasting relationships with cities 
outside of Washington and New York. Finally, 
our aim is to engage in a series of debates on U.S. 
global engagement with “grass-top” leaders – local 
individuals in industry and the public sector who 
serve as opinion leaders in their communities. Our 
goal has never been to lecture or teach Americans 
what they ought to think. Instead, we try to 
foster a genuine exchange of ideas that will allow 
the Americans we meet  to ask us hard questions 
and challenge some of our longstanding, core 
assumptions about the transatlantic relationship 
and broader U.S. foreign policy. 
Each trip that our teams go on follows the same 
general template. Over the course of two days, our 
small delegation hosts at least one large public 
event, speaks with members of the local press 
(which usually includes an editorial board meeting 
and AM talk radio), meets with business and 
political leaders, and visits a high school and/or a 
university. To date, we have visited Pittsburgh, Salt 
Lake City, and Tampa. As one might expect, these 
trips have taught us a lot so far, both about how to 
conduct programming “outside the Beltway” and 
about how Americans today are thinking about the 
world more broadly. Of course, a three-city tour 
doesn’t lend itself to any conclusive generalizations, 
particularly because we aren’t hearing from a full 
cross section of America in terms of race, ethnicity, 
and socio-economic status. But we believe that 
some of the early lessons from those three trips 
are worth sharing. 
Americans are generally eager to interact and 
engage about their country’s role in the world, 
but some remain skeptical. The first question we 
asked ourselves when we started this program was 
whether anyone would show up. Do Americans 
outside of Washington want to hear from and 
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engage in debates with the foreign policy elites 
who are popularly portrayed by the media as out of 
touch and irrelevant? To our great relief, especially 
after our well-attended public event in our first stop 
in Pittsburgh, we have found that people do indeed 
show up. Sometimes they turn out in stunningly 
large numbers. Our public events regularly draw 
audiences between 100 and 200 people, and I’ve 
personally spoken to audiences across the country 
that range in size from 300 to 700 people.
Between CNAS’ “Across the Pond” trips, my own 
personal invitations to speak to audiences in places 
like Ohio and New Hampshire, and anecdotes from 
colleagues running similar programs, there is no 
question that Americans are hungry to engage with 
policymakers and experts on foreign policy. That 
said, not everyone has welcomed us with open 
arms. In advance of our trip to Pittsburgh, I placed 
an op-ed in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette explaining 
the goals of our project and why it was important 
for folks like myself to get outside of Washington. 
The day that piece ran, CNAS received seven or 
eight phone calls — some profanity-laden — telling 
us to stay home. Because some of the calls included 
thinly veiled threats, we asked for police presence 
at our public event. Fortunately, we haven’t ever 
encountered that sentiment in person. But the 
fact that a program designed to seek and listen to 
alternative viewpoints can create such a visceral 
reaction has taught us a thing or two about just 
how deep the mistrust and animosity towards 
Washington really runs. 
Those phone calls reminded me of some of the 
reactions I encountered when I walked around the 
Washington monuments last summer with a video 
camera to ask American tourists what they thought 
about NATO. Most of the folks I approached were 
happy to offer a few comments. On a few occasions, 
however, parents held their children close and told 
me to back away, noting that they never talk to the 
“lamestream media.” My efforts to reassure them 
by stating calmly that I did not work for a TV or 
radio station failed. What has become clear to me 
both through that experience and our city visits 
is that we may never find ways to engage certain 
sectors of the population, particularly those that 
reject the premise that dialogue in itself is a useful 
exercise. Working for a think tank in Washington 
means I come from a different tribe and for some 
people, that’s enough reason to keep me at arm’s 
length.  
Finding a willing conservative, public audience 
in a large American city is difficult. Many U.S. 
cities are home to nonprofits such as the World 
Affairs Councils of America or the American 
Committees on Foreign Relations. The mission of 
these organizations is to create opportunities for 
dialogue with global leaders and policymakers. 
They play a critical role in educating both their 
members and the general public about pressing 
national security challenges. However, because 
many U.S. cities (even in red states) tilt blue, the 
audiences that those organizations draw tend 
to be heavy on the Democrats’ side. One of the 
major challenges we face in working with people 
outside of the Beltway has been identifying partner 
organizations that can help us reach a more 
politically diverse set of Americans. In the case 
of Pittsburgh, that meant leaving the downtown 
area and driving an hour to a neighboring red 
county to hold an event at a public library. In the 
case of Tampa, it meant spending hours on the 
phone finding libertarian and conservative groups 
and asking to help publicize our public event 
downtown. Those calls aren’t always easy to make. 
You spend an enormous amount of time explaining 
who you are, what you do, who funds your work, 
why you’re coming to town, and why they should 
care. In most cases, after a couple of calls, people 
offer to help. Occasionally, though, Washington’s 
image as an elitist, out-of-touch, and globalist hub 
fuels skepticism about the motives behind our 
project and ends the conversation. 
Form and format matter and can easily make 
or break efforts to engage Americans in an honest 
and civil debate. Americans might be interested in 
engaging on foreign policy, but they aren’t in the 
mood for a lecture, especially from a bunch of 
elitist wonks from the coast. That’s why we have 
very deliberately banned speeches at every event 
we attend or host. For large public forums, our 
moderator starts with one or two questions for 
our panelists and then immediately goes to the 
audience, often collecting four or five questions at 
a time in order to maximize the number of people 
that we can hear from. Audiences have reacted 
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positively to that format, often noting that they 
were surprised and relieved that we didn’t open 
with a long lecture. We also try to host a reception 
after our public events where people can approach 
our delegation one-on-one. With an audience of 100 
to 200 people or more, it’s impossible to engage in 
an ideal dialogue. However, using some of these 
formats has helped us hear from as many people 
as possible.
Another important lesson from this project is the 
importance of humility and a willingness to admit 
your mistakes, especially regarding policies that 
your audience might oppose. It is impossible to 
foster a genuine exchange of ideas if you start in 
a defensive crouch. In some of the events we’ve 
hosted, I have intentionally outlined some of the 
policies that I believe we got wrong during the 
Obama administration in which I served. Our 
European guests also have been refreshingly 
honest about some of their own policy errors or 
miscalculations. This kind of openness and honesty 
2  In a 2018 Pew Research Center poll, “defending against terrorism” ranked among the public’s leading priorities for the president and Congress, 
with nearly three-quarters (73 percent) saying it is a top priority. See Kristin Bialik, “State of the Union 2018: Americans’ Views on Key Issues Facing 
the Nation,” Pew Research Center, Jan. 18, 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/29/state-of-the-union-2018-americans-views-on-
key-issues-facing-the-nation/. 
3  Darrell M. West, “How to Combat Fake News and Disinformation,” Brookings Institution, Dec. 18, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/research/
how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/.
4  Josh Dawsey, Damian Paletta, and Erica Werner, “In Fundraising Speech, Trump Says He Made Up Trade Claim in Meeting with Justin Trudeau,” 
Mar. 15, 2018, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2018/03/14/in-fundraising-speech-trump-says-he-
made-up-facts-in-meeting-with-justin-trudeau/?utm_term=.a91a8dea0453.
can help disarm an American audience that is 
regularly bombarded with accusatory and divisive 
stories about folks on the other side of the aisle. 
No single foreign policy issue occupies the minds 
of Americans today — their questions vary by the 
hour. Looking at polling data on American threat 
perceptions, it is easy to get the impression that 
Americans are singularly worried about terrorism.2 
In the three cities we visited, however, we did not 
encounter many questions about terrorism or the 
Islamic State. Instead, we heard a wide array of 
questions and opinions on everything from NATO 
to North Korea to NAFTA. Unsurprisingly, the 
headlines shape the questions people ask, as do the 
backgrounds and expertise of our European guests. 
For example, the British Labor Party politician we 
took to Salt Lake City was peppered with questions 
about Brexit. The current Swedish ambassador to 
the United States was asked about her country’s 
efforts to be fossil-free by 2050. The former German 
defense minister took some pointed questions on 
defense spending. 
Some conspiracy theories and misleading 
narratives have taken root. Broadly speaking, 
the Americans we’ve met both at public events 
and in one-on-one meetings have been very 
well-informed. But in the age of disinformation3 
and with a president who has openly admitted 
to creating facts out of whole cloth,4 it is not 
uncommon to stumble upon sometimes disturbing 
myths, conspiracy theories, or falsehoods. This 
is especially true on the issues of immigration 
and refugees. The Swedish ambassador was 
asked by an audience member if Muslims living 
in her country were taking over Swedish culture 
or outproducing Swedes. On another trip, a local 
resident asked the current Danish ambassador to 
the United States if it was safe to travel to Europe 
because he had heard “there is a terrorist attack 
every single day and that people are getting robbed 
by gangs of refugees.” In Pittsburgh, I recorded 
a podcast with the former president of the 
Pittsburgh Rotary Club, who, in a discussion about 
U.S. and European immigration policies, claimed — 
falsely —  that some predominantly Muslim cities 
in both Michigan and North Carolina have fully 
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implemented Sharia.5 While this project isn’t about 
lecturing the Americans we meet, we have seized 
on opportunities to engage in myth busting where 
appropriate.
The issue of Russia has become so politicized that 
it’s dangerous to raise. Of all the issues we’ve debated 
to date, none is as politically charged as Russia, 
specifically Russian meddling in the 2016 election. 
Recent polling data has shown the emergence of a 
noticeable split among Democrats and Republicans 
on their views towards Russia, attempts to engage 
the Russians, and the president’s own relationship 
with Russia.6 For nearly two decades, Americans on 
both sides of the aisle have held similarly negative 
views toward Russia. But that ended after the 2016 
election. Democrats now hold a far less positive 
view towards Russia than Republicans do7 — only 
15 percent of Democrats have a favorable view of 
Russia, while 30 percent of Republicans do. Like 
domestic issues such as gun violence and the 
Second Amendment, one’s views on Russia now 
can easily reveal political party affiliation. 
We have felt that partisan divide on Russia in 
every city we have visited. Merely mentioning 
Russia quickly morphs into a scathing discussion 
about U.S. politics. Democrats are accused of 
conducting a “witch hunt.” Republicans are accused 
of being AWOL on Russian election meddling. 
There are also some fascinating twists and turns in 
all the Russia-related finger-pointing. Republicans 
who have attended our events like to remind 
Democrats that they once mocked presidential 
candidate Mitt Romney for stating that Russia was 
America’s greatest threat. Democrats at our events 
like to remind Republicans that they still mock 
former President Barack Obama for his Russian 
“reset” policy, even though many Republicans now 
support Trump’s effort to do something similar. 
In our discussions, we try our best to get away 
5  Julianne Smith and Andy Dlinn, “Andy Dlinn Talks Transatlantic Relations, Meaning Behind ‘America First,’” Center for a New American Security, 
Nov. 3, 2017, https://www.cnas.org/publications/podcast/andy-dlinn-talks-transatlantic-relations-meaning-behind-america-first.
6  According to YouGov polling, in July of 2014 just 10 percent of Democrats and nine percent of Republicans considered Russia “an ally” or 
“friendly” to U.S. interests. Three years later, in July of 2017, those numbers were 11 percent and 30 percent, respectively. Recently, in light of the 
Mueller probe, that gap has started to close. See Dylan Matthews, “Trump has Changed How Americans Think About Politics,” Vox, Jan. 30, 2018, 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/30/16943786/trump-changed-public-opinion-russia-immigration-trade. 
7  See the second chart, “Americans’ Opinions of Russia, By Party,” in Megan Brenan, “Americans, Particularly Democrats, Dislike Russia,” 
Gallup, Mar. 5, 2018, http://news.gallup.com/poll/228479/americans-particularly-democrats-dislike-russia.aspx?g_source=link_NEWSV9&g_
medium=tile_1&g_campaign=item_1642&g_content=Americans%2c%2520Particularly%2520Democrats%2c%2520Dislike%2520Russia.
from Russian interference in our election and ask 
some of our European guests to describe their 
country’s experiences with Russian aggression and 
what they’re doing about it. Europeans have been 
dealing with Russian acts of intimidation, energy 
coercion, and disinformation campaigns far longer 
than the United States. Sharing those experiences 
helps our audiences appreciate the scope of the 
problem. It also serves as a useful reminder that 
the transatlantic relationship isn’t always about 
America teaching or lecturing Europe. In many 
cases, such as how to grapple with Russian 
disinformation, we Americans can learn a lot from 
our European allies. 
U.S. mayors and other local politicians don’t feel 
hindered by today’s hyper-partisanship and are 
making up for the paralysis across Washington. 
After visits to only three cities, it’s hard to offer 
generalizable findings about anything that we’ve 
observed. We have found it refreshing, however, 
to hear so many stories from local politicians in 
the cities we have visited about their efforts to 
rise above the party politics currently paralyzing 
the nation’s capital. Unlike their counterparts 
in Congress, the mayors and county executives 
we’ve met are extending hands across the aisle, 
developing new relationships at home and abroad, 
and forming alliances across state lines to advance 
common agendas on everything from climate 
change to the opioid crisis. 
Americans of all political stripes 
are tired of carrying the proverbial 
burden of the West. Irrespective of 
party affiliation, hometown, or age, 
many of the Americans we have 
met have expressed some level of 
frustration with burden-sharing in 
international matters. That sentiment 
takes different forms: America does too 
much for European defense, America is the world’s 
policeman, or America provides too much aid to 
other countries. The basic message is that America 
is unfairly doing too much of something. What that 
means for the future of U.S. foreign policy, though, 
is far from clear. For some, Trump’s “America 
First” slogan and his accompanying policies on 
everything from trade to Syrian refugees are the 
answer. For others, however, the feeling that 
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America is doing or has done too much in the world 
doesn’t necessarily translate into opposition to free 
trade or a desire to leave the NATO alliance. In fact, 
a higher percentage of Americans in 2017 believed 
that global trade was good for the U.S. economy 
and consumers than in 2016.8 American support 
for the NATO alliance is also on the rise.9 But 
there is a palpable sentiment that America needs 
to encourage others to share a greater portion of 
the burden when it comes to global challenges. 
No future U.S. president can afford to ignore 
this. Even in cases where they support global 
engagement, Americans express a clear desire for 
more “leadership” from our partners and allies. 
CNAS’ “Across the Pond” project isn’t a scientific 
study about American attitudes, nor is it an 
attempt for policy elites to teach Americans in 
faraway places how to think about transatlantic 
relations and U.S. foreign policy. What it is at its 
core is a much-needed attempt at civil discourse 
and debate, free of insults and partisan attacks. But 
what about its impact, a term deeply familiar to 
those of us working in think tanks. In other words, 
what’s the point?
We don’t survey the people we meet through 
this project, so it is hard to know, short of a lot of 
positive feedback, whether our events are breaking 
8  “Munich Security Report 2018: To the Brink – and Back,” Munich Security Conference Foundation, Nov. 28, 2017, 22, https://www.
securityconference.de/en/discussion/munich-security-report/munich-security-report-2018/.
9  “Pew: NATO Approval on the Rise,” American Interest, May 24, 2017, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/05/24/pew-nato-approval-
on-the-rise/.
through the partisan noise and helping folks learn 
from each other. There are, however, a few concrete 
ways to measure change. The CNAS intern pool, 
often dominated by applicants from the East Coast, 
has become more geographically diverse. We are 
now receiving applications from every city we’ve 
visited, and we hope that will continue as we visit 
another nine cities. The Transatlantic Security 
Program also produces a weekly podcast and puts 
out a weekly newsletter, via email, on transatlantic 
issues. We have seen an increase in the number 
of subscribers to those two products, which helps 
CNAS with national outreach.
Perhaps the biggest impact, though, has been 
in regards to my own personal views about 
transatlantic relations. I have spent more than 
20 years working on Europe and advocating for a 
strong partnership with European allies. Over the 
course of the last year, I have worried that Trump’s 
sometimes benign, sometimes antagonistic views 
towards Europe were moving the two sides of the 
Atlantic away from their shared history and shared 
values. I have warned that making the transatlantic 
relationship more transactional would spell 
disaster. But as some of the people we’ve engaged 
outside of Washington have reminded me in recent 
months, it seems Europe has adjusted quite well 
97
The Strategist
to this new era. Contrary to my warnings, our 
European allies haven’t abandoned us just because 
we have a president who questions the utility of 
NATO and supports Brexit. Are these relationships 
more durable than I realized? Is the values aspect 
of the transatlantic relationship overstated?
These are the questions my colleagues and I 
don’t necessarily encounter in the near constant 
cycle of meetings and conferences across 
Washington. Many of us, myself included, can 
find ourselves trapped in defending the status 
quo. For example, U.S. presidents always reiterate 
America’s unwavering commitment to NATO’s 
Article 5 clause on their first trip to Brussels. 
When Trump failed to do this last summer, 
Washington pundits, scholars, and journalists 
spent weeks warning about the consequences of 
departing from that tradition. This project gives us 
an opportunity to interact with people who don’t 
necessarily react the same way to a president that 
regularly challenges the bipartisan consensus on 
U.S. foreign policy. 
Finally, “Across the Pond” is an attempt to 
mine the country for fresh ideas. Not all of the 
answers for addressing Chinese cyber-attacks, 
Russian disinformation campaigns, or a brewing 
trade war with Europe — to name just a few of 
today’s challenges — can be found in the White 
House Situation Room or large conference tables 
at Washington think tanks. Policymakers on both 
sides of the Atlantic must engage chambers of 
commerce, trade associations, and the private 
sector where one finds a greater degree of agility 
and innovation. Former policymakers on these 
trips also need to signal to universities what kind 
of skill sets governments will need in the future. 
For example, with so many U.S. adversaries relying 
on asymmetric tactics designed to undermine 
America’s technological edge, the U.S. government 
will need more graduates with backgrounds in 
both policy and technology. These are some of the 
conversations we’re having on these trips.  
On their letterhead, program materials, and 
websites, think tanks often make oversized 
claims about their impact. They are either solving 
intractable problems or charting a course towards a 
better world. Or both. We certainly aren’t prepared 
to argue that our “Across the Pond, in the Field” 
project is going to change the world. We do believe, 
however, that it is a much-needed attempt to break 
out of the conventional think tank model. That 
doesn’t mean we’ll stop researching and working 
on those tough policy dilemmas in Syria and North 
Korea. All of that important work will continue. 
But we will continue to implement this project in 
parallel to give us (and our European guests) the 
chance to pause, get outside the Beltway, question 
our core assumptions, and hear from folks that 
look at the world differently. Our next stop will be 
Grand Rapids, Michigan, in June.  
Julianne Smith directs the Transatlantic 
Security Program at the Center for a New American 
Security (CNAS) and is the former deputy national 
security advisor to former Vice President Joseph 
Biden.
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